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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSE MARIE HUME, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
SMALL CLAIMS COURT OF 
MURRAY CITY, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 15634 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Appellant is now before this Court seeking to ~ 
allowed to pursue her right to appeal to the District court 
from a small claims judgment entered against her. The 
Respondent City Court that entered the small claims judgmen: 
refuses to forward the record to the District Court on the 
ground that Appellant did not appeal within five days after 
entry of the judgment. The reason Appellant did not ti~~ 
appeal is that she did not receive notice that the judg~~ 
had been entered until after the five-day period had elapse 
Respondent takes the indefensible position that the five-d• 
period began to run when the judgment was entered notwith5t 
that the record is devoid of sufficient evidence that ~~ 
gave her notice of the judgment's entry. 
-
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Respondent's Brief wholly ignores the merits of 
Appellant's claim to her right of appeal and, instead, 
asserts that Appellant may not now be heard on the merits 
because of a procedural technicality. On this procedural 
point Respondent is incorrect; Appellant's remaining points 
stand unanswered. 
I APPELLANT'S MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT 
UNDER RULE 59(e) WAS PROPER PROCEDURE. 
Appellant petitioned the District Court for a Writ 
of Mandamus compelling Respondent City Court to forward its 
record for appeal. Upon dismissal of the Petition, Appellant 
moved the District Court pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to alter its judgment -- essentially, 
to reconsider its decision. 
In moving the District Court to alter its judgment, 
Appellant presented further legal arguments as to why her 
Petition should have been granted, in view of the deficiencies 
in Respondent's factual presentation at the hearing on the 
Petition. Appellant attempted to conserve judicial resources 
by exhausting every available avenue for relief from the 
District Court before appealing to this Court. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is identical to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). In his discussion of 
Federal Rule 59(e), Professor Moore flatly states that a 
-2-
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Motion to Alter pursuant to Rule 59 (e) is a proper means to 
seek reconsideration or reversal of a judgment. Moore, thus, 
directly contradicts the sole argument in Respondent's 
brief. 6A Moore's Federal Practice ~159.13 at 59-250 (1974) 
The cases cited in Appellant's original Brief support MooR' 
interpretation of the Rule. See also Browder v. Director, 
Ill. Dept. of Corrections, 
529 n. 5 (1978). 
U.S. , 54 L.Ed. 2d 521, 
The few cases cited in Respondent's Brief do not 
refute Appellant's position that a Rule 59(e) motion is a 
proper means to seek reconsideration of a judgment. In Ut~ 
State Employees Credit union v. Riding, 24 Utah 2d 211, 469 
P.2d 1 (1970), a disappointed litigant moved the district 
court, presumably pursuant to Rule 59 (e), to vacate a judgme: 
The court refused. The litigant then moved the court again 
under Rule 59(e) to reconsider its refusal to vacate its 
judgment. In essence, the litigant brought two successive 
motions seeking reconsideration of a judgment. Accordingly, 
Riding stands out for the very reasonable proposition thata 
motion to reconsider a motion to reconsider is improper. 
Riding prevents an endless string of Rule 59 (e) motions; it 
does not prohibit one Rule 59(e) motion. 
-3-
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Erickson Tool Co. v. Balas Cullet Co., 277 F.Supp. 
226 (N.D. Ohio 1967), Respondent's only other principal 
case, also stands for the proposition that a party is en-
tiLled only to one motion to reconsider. In Erickson Tool, 
an unsuccessful party moved the court to reconsider its 
fjndin9s of fact and make contrary findings instead. The 
court heard the motion but decided to retain its findings 
and denied the motion. The party then further moved the 
court, pursuant to Rule 59(e), to reconsider its findings a 
second time. The court's refusal to entertain the additional 
motion was merely another application of the rule that a 
motion to reconsider the denial of a motion to reconsider is 
improper. 
Neither Riding nor Erickson Tool is relevant to 
the present case. ·Appellant's cases and secondary authority 
that her Rule 59(e) motion was procedurally proper stand 
effectively uncontradicted. 
II APPELLANT PROPERLY RAISES BEFORE THIS COURT 
ALL ARGUMENTS WHY HER RULE 59(e) MOTION 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
In her original Brief, Appellant pointed out the 
District Court's error in rebuffing her Rule 59(e) motion as 
procedurally improper. Appellant then addressed the sub-
stantive reasons why the District Court should have granted 
her Petition for a Writ of Mandamus. Respondent incorrectly 
-4-
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argues that only the procedural question -- and not the 
substantive issues -- are now before this Court. 
According to Professor Moore, the effect of the 
denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is to restore the finality of 
the judgment sought to be altered and restart the appeal 
period for that judgment. 6A Moore's Federal Practice 
• 59.13 at 59-256 (1974). Appellant has timely appealed h[ 
the denial of her Rule 59(e) motion, placing before this 
Court all issues -- substantive as well as procedural 
relative to why her motion should have been granted. 
Appellant's procedural point is that the Rule 59 (e) motion 
should have been heard; her substantive point is that it 
should have been granted. The substantive issues are the 
same that would be before this Court had an appeal been 
taken directly from the denial of Appellant's Petition fm: 
Writ of Mandamus. It is clear that a District Court's 
denial of a Petition for Writ of Mandamus may be the su~K 
of an appeal to this Court. See, ~·, Archer v. Utah State 
Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 P. 2d 622 ( 1964) . 
The question before this Court, then, is whether 
the District Court's decision is correct, not just whethti 
the procedural reason for the decision is correct. All 
matters raised in the District Court, not just those upon 
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m 
or' 
which the District Court may have based its decision, are 
subject to appellate review. 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and 
Error §726 at n.18 (1962). Both the procedural and sub-
stantive issues are therefore before this Court, and Appellant 
properly addressed them in her original brief. 
III IF THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE ONLY THE PROCEDURAL 
ISSUE, IT SHOULD NEVERTHELESS GUIDE THE DISTRICT 
COURT IN CONSIDERING ALL THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 
THAT WILL BE RAISED UPON REMAND. 
Appellant makes one further point in the event 
that this Court decides the procedural issue in Appellant's 
favor, but remands the case to the District Court for consi-
aeration of the substantive issues. This Court has consistently 
held that when it remands a case, its opinion should guide 
the lower court on any issues of law that will have to be 
considered. Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 
119, 121 (Utah l977); LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 
Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615, 617 (1966). This Court's opinion, 
therefore, should at least address the substantive issues 
even if they are not finally decided. 
CONCLUSION 
The authority is uncontradicted that Appellant's 
Motion to Alter pursuant to Rule 59(e) was procedurally 
proper. The District Court erred when it denied Appellant's 
motion on the ground that it was procedurally improper. 
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This court should reverse the District Court both on the 
ground of procedure and on the merits. The merits involw 
important issues of law, based on constitutional, statutor, 
and common law principles. This Court should decide them 
based on the authority that Appellant has presented in her 
original Brief. This Court need not leave these important 
issues to be decided by the District Court and to be the 
subject of another appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By LUCY BILLINGS 
Attorney for Plaihtif f/Ap~L 
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